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Reciprocity, Justice, and Disability*
Lawrence C. Becker
The adequacy of a theory of distributive justice is now measured partly
by its success in dealing with justice for the disabled. It was not always
so. Up to and including Rawls, no major theory of justice in the Western
philosophical tradition made disability a prominent issue.1 No doubt
that was partly due to the fact that until the last half of the twentieth
century, the number of severely disabled people who had any reasonable
hope of long-term survival was small, and until recent medical advances,
the medical treatment and social arrangements that could help them
were limited and relatively cheap. Thus, until recently it was probably
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the conference on disability at
the Jean Beer Blumenfeld Center for Ethics, Georgia State University, May 7–8, 2004. My
thanks to Christopher Wellman, the organizer of that conference, and to all of the other
participants for their help in improving my arguments. The line of argument here about
social contract theory and the “Tough-Crowd Problem” developed from a set of symposium
comments on Martha Nussbaum’s paper “Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens,” American
Philosophical Association Pacific Division meetings, San Francisco, March 2003. The re-
statement of my work on reciprocity offered here is a much revised version of a paper
given to the Virginia Philosophical Association in October 2003.
1. But see the large literature that has grown out of Amartya Sen’s notion of equal
capabilities, redescribed in Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1992), and, more generally, criticism of Rawls on this issue. See, e.g., Martha Nuss-
baum, “Beyond the Social Contract: Toward Global Justice,” Tanner Lectures in Human
Values, Australian National University, Canberra, November 12–13, 2002, lecture 1, “Ca-
pabilities and the Mentally Disabled”; full text at http://philrsss.anu.edu.au/tanner/. An
especially impressive rethinking of distributive justice by way of a “dependency critique”—
recognizing not only the special demands of caring for the disabled but the ordinary
demands of caring for all human beings during their long periods of dependency—may
be found in Eva Kittay, Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency (New York:
Routledge, 1999). That book certainly insists that every theory of justice must be tested
with respect to the issues of providing care for the profoundly disabled and of compen-
sating those who care for them. It is also fair to say that Peter Singer has made disability
a test case for his utilitarian theory of justice, by, among other things, his efforts to confront
problems of infanticide and euthanasia for those profoundly disabled human beings who
are not, and can never be, “persons.” See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics, 2nd ed. (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1993). And Alasdair MacIntyre has addressed dependency in
Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Chicago: Open Court, 1999).
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plausible to think that a proper distribution of wealth could handle such
matters without special philosophical attention to the extent and nature
of people’s disabilities.2
Circumstances have changed. In affluent, developed, stable nations
with good medical systems, many people with major physical and cog-
nitive disabilities have life expectancies after onset that are 85 percent
to 95 percent of that of the population as a whole.3 That is, the disabled
have such life expectancies if substantial social resources are committed
to them and if the necessary caregivers can be found. Under such cir-
cumstances, the number of people who live with major disabilities has
increased dramatically, and, in the space of a few decades, it has become
implausible to construct a theory of distributive justice that does not
take this into account.4 Doing so however can be incendiary, at least if
2. The same point has been made about health care generally. See the criticism of
it by Norman Daniels, “Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice,” Philosophy & Public
Affairs 10 (1981): 147–49.
3. Taking the example of a healthy two-year-old male in California in 1997, whose
life expectancy from that point on was 71.1 years, a comparable two-year-old male with
cerebral palsy had a life expectancy that ranged from 13.5 years (if he was a quadriplegic
unable to lift his head and was fed by a gastrostomy tube), to 20.2 years (if he was unable
to lift his head and was fed by tube but was not a quadriplegic), to 48.7 years (if he was
a quadriplegic but able to roll over and was not fed by tube), to 63.3 years if he was not
a quadriplegic and was able to sit up. By comparison, life expectancy after spinal cord
injury, with onset at age 10, ranged from 40.5 to 58.2 additional years depending on the
severity of the injury. In the general population the life expectancy at age 10 was then
65.9 years. David Strauss and Robert Shavelle, “Life Expectancy: What Lawyers Need to
Know,” Clinical Risk 5 (1998): 25–26, 26. For an analysis of data for cerebral palsy, Down
syndrome, and some other disabilities, see David Strauss and Robert Shavelle, “Life Ex-
pectancy of Persons with Chronic Disabilities,” Journal of Insurance Medicine 30 (1998):
96–108. Fifty years ago, life expectancy in the United States after the onset of a major
disability was dramatically less, often in the range of less than one year to ten years. But
getting precise estimates of life expectancy for the severely disabled is difficult. Survival
data are changing rapidly; there are conceptual disputes about the definitions of ‘severe’
and ‘disabled’; there are technical problems about the statistical models used to aggregate
and disaggregate the raw data from public health agencies; and neither those agencies
nor disability advocacy groups seem very interested in making such estimates. That leaves
us with the work of some academic demographers (such as Strauss and Shavelle, above),
insurance company actuaries, and trial lawyers.
4. What counts as a disability varies greatly with respect to both the physical and social
environment, and worldwide, summary statistics on disability are notoriously hard to get.
The United Nations Statistics Division repeatedly warns about the dangers of compiling data
from different countries rather than simply listing them country by country. See http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/disability/alldata.htm. Nonetheless, in some documents of nongovern-
mental organizations relating to the ongoing negotiations for a UN “convention” on disability,
we find statements such as the following: “The UN and the WHO estimate that there are
some 600 million people with disabilities worldwide, of those some 80 percent, or 400 million
people are living in developing countries.” See Disabled Peoples International, “Disability
Negotiations Summary,” at http://www.dpi.org/en/events/un_conv/un_conv.htm. United
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the effort is simply to extend standard utilitarian or contractarian the-
ories of justice to cover disability.5
The current philosophical landscape does not make the issue easy.
On the one hand, there is the well-established commitment to making
justice a matter of fairness and equality for all human beings, plus the
well-established lines of argument that urge us to extend theories of
justice to nonhuman animals and to the inanimate environment as well.
On the other hand, we continue to build theories of justice out of
notions of mutual advantage, aggregate welfare, moral agency, human
flourishing, membership in the moral community, and participation in
social conventions and social institutions. Those theory-building notions
inevitably limit or at any rate focus attention on arrangements made by
and for capable moral agents who have much to gain and lose from
the cooperative arrangements they make or fail to make with each
States president George W. Bush, in the document outlining his “New Freedom Initiative”
for the disabled on February 1, 2001, states that “today, there are over 54 million Americans
with disabilities, a full 20 percent of the U.S. population. Almost half of these individuals
have a severe disability, affecting their ability to see, hear, walk, or perform other basic
functions of life. In addition, there are over 25 million family caregivers and millions more
who provide aid and assistance to people with disabilities.” See the text at http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/freedominitiative/freedominitiative.html. See also Department
of Health and Human Services, “Delivering on the Promise: U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Self-Evaluation to Promote Community Living for People with Disabilities,”
available at http://www.hhs.gov/newfreedom/final/: “In FY 2000, total HHS expenditures
for people with disabilities was $73.5 billion. The largest of these expenditures was for
Medicaid ($43 billion). Medicare spending totaled approximately $28 billion. The Social
Services Block Grant spent $1.8 billion, while the Substance Abuse Block Grant totaled $1.6
billion. Another billion dollars was awarded in grants under the Older Americans Act. A
total of 24 HHS programs provide services to people with disabilities” (5). The “New Freedom
Initiative” was provoked in part by the Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 527
U.S. 581 (1999), which deals with the following provisions of the Americans with Disabilities
Act: “In the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Congress described the isolation
and segregation of individuals with disabilities as a serious and pervasive form of discrimi-
nation. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (5). Title II of the ADA, which proscribes discrimination
in the provision of public services, specifies, inter alia, that no qualified individual with a
disability shall, ‘by reason of such disability,’ be excluded from participation in, or be denied
the benefits of, a public entity’s services, programs, or activities. §12132. Congress instructed
the Attorney General to issue regulations implementing Title II’s discriminationproscription.
See §12134(a). One such regulation, known as the ‘integration regulation,’ requires a ‘public
entity [to] administer . . . programs . . . in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.’ 28 CFR § 35.130(d). A further prescription,
here called the ‘reasonable-modifications regulation,’ requires public entities to ‘make rea-
sonable modifications’ to avoid ‘discrimination on the basis of disability,’ but does not require
measures that would ‘fundamentally alter’ the nature of the entity’s programs. §35.130(b)(7)”
(quoted from the opening paragraph of the syllabus).
5. The disability rights advocacy group Not Dead Yet protested Peter Singer’s ap-
pointment at Princeton on this ground. For an account of a later encounter, see Harriet
McBryde Johnson, “Unspeakable Conversations,” New York Times Magazine, February 16,
2003, 50–67.
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other.6 Any theory of justice founded on the notions of impartiality and
individual well-being (whether consequentialist or perfectionist) threat-
ens to discount the welfare of the disabled. Any theory of justice founded
on the notions of self-interest and mutual advantage (whether conse-
quentialist or contractarian) threatens to exclude some disabled people
from social conventions or contracts altogether.7
To many disabled people or their advocates, what seems to be wrong
with standard theories of justice, at least in the case of profound cog-
nitive disabilities, is that they do not adequately or securely locate en-
titlements in the interests, claims, or persons of the disabled individuals
themselves. Rather, in social contract theory for example, it seems that
rational agents get together and make contracts among themselves
which may or may not deal with the disabled in a derivative way, by
proxy or through trustee arrangements. Moreover, in theories designed
to maximize aggregate welfare, it seems that the interests of humans
with profound cognitive disabilities are so heavily discounted that they
are effectively uncounted in the aggregation procedure. For that reason,
advocates for the disabled may initially be more comfortable with a
vaguely Kantian or theological theory of justice founded on the infinite
moral worth or dignity of every human being, which concept of dignity
is then often translated into a doctrine of inalienable human rights—
rights not only to life, liberty, and property but also to health and ha-
bilitation. Even granting that such rights can be given a convincing
philosophical foundation (a large grant to make), this leaves us with
seemingly interminable arguments about positive versus negative rights,
claim rights versus liberties, and conflicts of rights in situations of
scarcity.
In what follows I will take a different course. I will argue that an
adequate conception of reciprocity goes a long way toward answering
the challenge that disability poses to theories of justice. I believe this is
true for both impartialist and mutual advantage theories, but I will focus
here on the latter because they seem to me to present the most inter-
esting challenges.8 I will begin with some remarks about mutual advan-
tage theories and why it is important not to give up on them. I will
6. Much to gain and lose, at least, under conditions of moderate scarcity, limited
altruism, and rough equality of power and vulnerability—i.e., in the so-called circumstances
of justice in which Hume argued that it makes sense to formulate a concept of justice.
See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 3, pt. 2, sec. 2, and “Of Justice,” in Enquiry
concerning the Principles of Morals, pt. 1, sec. 3.
7. Nussbaum, “Beyond the Social Contract,” lecture 1, “Capabilities and the Mentally
Disabled,” sec. 2, “Rawlsian Contractarianism.”
8. Here I accept, for convenience, Brian Barry’s division of possibilities for theories
of justice. See Brian Barry, Theories of Justice, vol. 1 of A Treatise on Social Justice (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989).
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follow this with some arguments about reciprocity and justice and why
it is important to operate with a well-developed conception of reciprocity
in this context. Then I will outline a candidate conception of reciprocity
and close with some reflections on its consequences for justice for the
disabled.
I. THE TOUGH-CROWD PROBLEM AND JUSTICE AS
MUTUAL ADVANTAGE
For good historical reasons, mutual advantage theory in the modern
era addresses the task that Socrates begins in the first two books of
Plato’s Republic—namely, trying to convince political realists like Thra-
symachus that they should endorse a way of life based on a conception
of justice rather than one based on the unfettered exercise of power.
And like Socrates, modern theorists have relied on the notion that
norms of justice are compatible with self-interest. Unlike Socrates, how-
ever, modern theorists have decided to confront Thrasymachus in a
serious way rather than to humiliate him and push him out of the
discussion.
Mutual advantage theorists have thus faced squarely what we may
call the Tough-Crowd Problem in political theory: the problem of per-
sistent, life-and-death conflicts between people who are politically en-
gaged and willing to deal with each other—rather than fight as a first
resort—but who have irreconcilable views about human good and the
good life. The aim has been to find common ground that yields agree-
ment on a substantive theory of justice. Rational self-interest is one
obvious piece of common ground, and mutually advantageous arrange-
ments made upon that ground are generally more stable than a mere
modus vivendi.
Moreover, we can make a plausible case for thinking that self-
interest is the most inclusive piece of common ground capable of gen-
erating stable political arrangements in any society where there is sig-
nificant diversity. It is not that the political world is full of sociopaths
or psychological egoists. Almost everyone who is able to deliberate at
all has a sharp sense of injustice and at least a vague general conception
of fairness, for example. And almost everyone who is competent and
willing to deliberate about such matters has an elaborate combination
of egoistic and nonegoistic interests—interests in the common good,
the general welfare, the perfection of social organization and forms of
government, for example, in addition to concerns about the dear self.
Moreover, even many of our egoistic interests are linked causally to the
welfare of others and present themselves to us as primarily about the
welfare of those other people rather than about our own. Nonetheless,
decision making in a political context—especially in discussions about
the basic structure of society—often brings frankly self-interested con-
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cerns to the forefront, making their satisfaction a necessary condition
of political agreements. The anthropology and ethnology, not to men-
tion the historical record, suggest that this is so in human societies
generally, from Stone Age cultures to contemporary industrial ones.
More than that, it appears that in foundational political contexts self-
interest has lexical priority for a wide range of powerful political actors.
There are plenty of people who, if not satisfied on this score, will re-
peatedly scuttle other political arrangements at the constitutional level.
Social contract theory aimed at achieving arrangements for mutual
advantage is part of what Ronald Dworkin calls the great liberal settle-
ment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Europe. Settle-
ment, we might think, is the wrong word, given the slaughter in Europe
ever since, especially in the globalized conflicts of the twentieth century.
But it is important to notice that people rarely ride into battle under
the banner of mutual advantage. Rather, they go to war under the flag
of some form of ideological or theological perfectionism, or for patriotic
reasons, national or self interest, self-defense, glory, or simply because
they like to fight. They make peace for mutual advantage—at least when
they cannot get or give unconditional surrender.
I suggest that as a philosophical project in political theory the idea
of justice as mutual advantage is as important today as it was during the
Thirty Years’ War. If we cannot solve this Tough-Crowd Problem, if we
cannot build robust and sustainable commitments to justice between
ourselves and those whom we regard as powerful but evil, powerful but
amoral, powerful but unreasonable, or powerful but badly wrong in
their conception of the good life, then we have little chance, short of
perpetual warfare, of protecting the disabled or anyone else. Whatever
else we do, surely we must continue the struggle to find a theory of
justice that will get the reflective endorsement of hard-boiled political
realists, opportunistic free riders, enthusiastic anarchists, resourceful
skeptics, cultural relativists, ideologues of all stripes, members of militant
religions, relentless advocates for special interests.
This is a tough crowd—a long way from the congenial company
that Socrates had after Thrasymachus fell silent or from the company
of adult men of good character that Aristotle imagined was necessary
for productive political philosophy. In pliant, like-minded company we
have the luxury to consider political arrangements that are fully satis-
fying—even, perhaps, to pursue some form of ethical perfectionism. But
just as modern social contract theorists have supposed, successful prof-
fers to the tough crowd have to be ones that the strongest, most ruthless,
most energetic, and self-reliant parties will endorse as in their own best
interest, given their strategic situations. And (in theory) the only sort
of strategic situation in which every member of this crowd would make
an agreement with the others is one in which no other individual can
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dominate anyone else or can dominate a few into forming a coalition
against the rest. The result is one of the major features of the bargaining
situation imagined by social contract theorists: namely, one in which all
parties to the bargaining are roughly equal, free, and independent.
The role of political philosophy, then, is first and foremost to con-
vince the tough crowd that there is more to making agreements in this
situation than pure power politics and that the range of legitimate social
contracts is defined by the norms of deliberative rationality and pro-
cedural justice. This may seem unduly limited. Mutual advantage the-
ories aimed at convincing the tough crowd seem like an attempt to find
the lowest common denominator. This raises the possibility that there
might be a stubborn theoretical gap (e.g., with respect to the disabled)
between genuinely “political” conceptions of justice (mutual advantage
theories) and justice construed as an a priori ideal (supreme principle
or perfectionist theories). It behooves political philosophers in the mu-
tual advantage tradition to try to close gaps of that sort by showing that
the lowest common procedural denominator does not have to yield
mean-spirited or miserly principles.
A standard opening move toward doing that is to expand the fran-
chise—in particular, to convince the tough crowd that the group of free
and independent equals with whom they need to negotiate is very large.
Hobbes famously does this by arguing that all adult human beings in
the rather wide normal range of physical and intellectual abilities are
roughly equal, if for no other reasons than that the weak can kill the
strong by stealth and that the strong will always have to depend on
others for protection while they sleep, eat, have their backs turned, or
their pants down. And in a state of nature, of course, everyone is free
and solitary as well. Others have made this opening move first by de-
fining the class of moral agents who have something to offer in recip-
rocal exchanges and then by arguing for the cooperative advantages of
dealing with them as equals.
The history of mutual advantage theories (and theories of justice
generally) is replete with mistakes on this topic—restriction of the fran-
chise to healthy, nondisabled, property-owning adult males, for example.
But such mistakes are capable of self-correction within mutual advantage
theory, since it is easy to show (and many, perhaps most, people are
now capable of seeing) that such restrictions of the franchise are self-
defeating. This is not so, or at least not obviously so, with the restriction
of the franchise to free, independent, and roughly equal parties. That
is something that the tough crowd is likely to hold out for, and it may
seem to exclude or marginalize the disabled at the outset. But does it?
The answer is a qualified no. In mutual advantage theories, the
bargaining group will necessarily include (a) a large range of disabled
people (those who are perfectly capable of lethal attacks on the strong,
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or of free and independent deliberation and action, or of valuable
reciprocal exchanges) and (b) all caregivers. This is so because, in any
philosophically plausible mutual advantage theory, the bargaining group
must include at least everyone that the tough crowd must include for
strategic reasons—everyone, for example, whose exclusion from the pro-
cess is likely to undermine the effectiveness or stability of the conven-
tions, contracts, and institutions that are advantageous to the tough
crowd.9 That has significant consequences for the disabled. To see this,
consider the following.
II. DISABILITY, STRATEGIC DECISIONS, AND
THE TOUGH CROWD
Suppose it is the case that in mutual advantage bargaining with the
tough crowd, the agents who design the basic structure are “free, equal,
and independent” adults of roughly equal powers (or perhaps idealized
rational powers), motivated by rational self-interest. Perhaps they are
also, as Rawls would have it, thinking of themselves as “fully cooperating
members of society over a complete life.” But it does not follow from
this that such bargaining agents would think they were in a strategic
situation in which they could afford to design the basic structure of
society only for themselves—or only for people like themselves elsewhere
in the world, or even (perhaps) only for human beings. How could they
possibly think this, except perhaps as a temporary theoretical simplifi-
cation to be revised later?10 Ideal bargaining agents will know that any
arrangements they make will provoke responses from outside the bar-
gaining circle—creating feedback loops that will generate both oppor-
tunities and problems. They will therefore be aware that they must
design institutions strategically, so as to manage these feedback loops.
The sort of strategic thinking the bargainers will have to do with
respect to the disabled depends very much on facts about the world in
which the bargainers live. In any era or social circumstance in which
costly medical interventions are about as likely to harm as they are to
help, access to such health care is not likely to be a high priority for
theories of justice. Today, in something like our situation, mutual ad-
vantage bargainers will be aware that there are many long-lived human
beings who temporarily or permanently lack the ability to participate
9. I am grateful to Russell Hardin, whose conversation, correspondence, and books
have helped me understand how important it is for moral and political theory to be self-
consciously strategic rather than merely parametric in its reasoning. See, e.g., his books
Morality within the Limits of Reason Alone (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) and
Indeterminacy and Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).
10. Rawls postpones a number of things in this way, in addition to problems of the
disabled. For example, he postpones problems of “partial compliance.” See John Rawls,
A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 8.
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in the bargaining, and they will be aware that they themselves are vul-
nerable to disease or injury or accident that can put them in this class.
They will be aware that medical care—both acute care and rehabilitative
care—together with special education and the now impressive range of
assistive technology, can do a great deal to offset the limitations of some
physical and mental disabilities. Moreover, they will understand how it
may happen that they themselves, while fortunate in their own abilities,
might have long-lived but seriously disabled children, friends, and neigh-
bors—people whom they love deeply and whose welfare is inextricably
connected, psychologically, to their own. They will understand that many
of their fellow citizens, including perhaps themselves, but especially, and
disproportionately, women, might be seriously burdened with the care
of disabled people they love. And each bargainer will understand that
even if she herself escapes disability and caring for the disabled, the
fact that many others will not escape these things poses a strategic
problem.
The strategic problem is simply this: the basic institutions of society
will have to be designed not only to deal with the disabled themselves
but to accommodate the people who love and care for the disabled,
both for the sake of efficiency and for the sake of stability. So the basic
structure that idealized bargainers design not only will be designed from
the beginning with the disabled in mind but will be designed for the
disabled and for their caregivers as well as for the bargainers themselves.
These considerations will not be derivative matters but central ones—
every bit as central as dealing strategically with Thrasymachus and his
crowd.
The question that remains is whether such strategic bargaining with
the tough crowd will lead to institutions that satisfy our broader ethical
concerns about the disabled. It is fairly easy to show that, for strategic
reasons alone, mutual advantage theories will justify robust, flexible, sta-
bilizing social institutions and strong social insurance schemes and to
show that those schemes will (given our circumstances) address at least
some of the needs of the disabled.11 What I want to explore next is
whether taking more careful account of the sort of reciprocity appro-
priate for mutual advantage bargaining will do enough beyond that to
satisfy the concerns that would otherwise push us toward problematic
notions of human dignity.
The aim is not to “moralize” mutual advantage theories before the
11. I have explored some of this in “Afterword: Disability, Strategic Action, and Rec-
iprocity,” in Disability, Difference, and Discrimination, ed. Anita Silvers, David Wasserman, and
Mary Mahowald (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 293–303. This is perhaps
the place to thank Anita Silvers for pressing me repeatedly, beginning in the mid-1990s,
to address philosophical questions about disability more directly.
18 Ethics October 2005
discussion begins.12 That is unlikely to impress the tough crowd. Rather,
the aim is to show the tough crowd that when they bargain with others
for mutual advantage, they will need to do so in terms of a developed
conception of the mutual advantage (reciprocity) already implicit in
their aims. It turns out, I believe, that such a developed conception of
reciprocity—simply in order to avoid being self-defeating—will endorse
significant, supportive arrangements for the disabled.
III. RECIPROCITY AND JUSTICE
Reciprocity is a matter of making a fitting and proportional return for
the good or ill we receive. That is the general concept of it, common
to social norms everywhere. Within that general concept there are com-
peting “conceptions” of reciprocity—attempts to turn the general con-
cept into a more determinative set of norms and standards.13 It is worth
remembering (by referring to the anthropology) that every society of
record has an elaborate set of social practices that amounts to a pre-
theoretical conception of reciprocity, that such pretheoretical concep-
tions differ significantly from each other, and that they are everywhere
regarded as defining something fundamental to human life. This poses
an important problem for social and political philosophers—namely,
deciding which conception of reciprocity is best, all things considered.
It is difficult to understand why this problem, compared to the similar
one about justice, has received so little attention.14
Consider Rawls, who made increasing reference to reciprocity over
the years. In A Theory of Justice, in 1971, he says that “the difference
principle expresses a conception of reciprocity. It is a principle of mutual
benefit.”15 He explains that when the difference principle is satisfied,
12. I am grateful to Richard Arneson for pressing me to make this point clear.
13. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, makes this point with respect to justice (5). He notes
that he is following a distinction made by H. L. A. Hart, in The Concept of Law (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1961), 155–59.
14. Eva Kittay (Love’s Labor, 67–68, 106–9) is a prominent exception. She formulates
a conception of reciprocity she calls doulia, or reciprocity-in-connection, which is designed
to capture an aspect of generalized reciprocity in which “what goes around comes around”
with respect to providing dependency care for all human beings (not just the disabled)
and care as well for those who do “dependency work”—where ‘work’ is defined in this
context as what is morally required of others for the survival and health of dependent
ones. The term doulia is one she derives from doula, “a postpartum caregiver who assists
the mother, and at times relieves her. . . . Instead of the timeworn paid help—the ‘baby
nurse,’ who displaces the mother by taking over care of the infant—the doula assists by
caring for the mother as the mother attends to the child.” Extending this concept to cover
dependency relationships generally, and conceiving of it as a form of reciprocity, Kittay
proposes the following principle of doulia: “Just as we [ourselves] have required care to survive
and thrive, so we need to provide conditions that allow others—including those who do the work of
caring—to receive the care they need to survive and thrive.”
15. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 102.
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the least advantaged will benefit from the inequalities produced or left
in place by the scheme for social cooperation, and the most favored
members of society will benefit also, from the willing cooperation of all
the others.16 This is one of the reasons he thinks the difference principle
is superior to utilitarianism, since the latter does not guarantee mutual
or reciprocal benefits and therefore does not provide a self-interested
motive for adopting its supreme principle.17 He repeats these arguments
more pointedly in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, published in 2001,
but does not develop the underlying conception of reciprocity that he
is using.18 In fact, one could argue that he is not using a “conception”
16. Ibid., 103. He says, “We have seen that, at least when chain connection holds,
each representative man can accept the basic structure as designed to advance his interests.
The social order can be justified to everyone, and in particular to those who are least
favored; and in this sense is egalitarian. . . . Now what can be said to the more favored
man? To begin with, it is clear that the well-being of each depends on a scheme of social
cooperation without which no one could have a satisfactory life. Secondly, we can ask for
the willing cooperation of everyone only if the terms of the scheme are reasonable. The
difference principle, then, seems to be a fair basis on which those better endowed, or
more fortunate in their social circumstances, could expect others to collaborate with them
when some workable arrangement is a necessary condition of the good of all.”
17. Ibid., 14. He says, “Once the principles of justice are thought of as arising from
an original agreement in a situation of equality, it is an open question whether the principle
of utility would be acknowledged. Offhand it hardly seems likely that persons who view
themselves as equals, entitled to press their claims upon one another, would agree to a
principle which may require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater
sum of advantages enjoyed by others. Since each desires to protect his interests, his capacity
to advance his conception of the good, no one has a reason to acquiesce in an enduring
loss for himself in order to bring about a greater net balance of satisfaction. In the absence
of strong and lasting benevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure
merely because it maximized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its permanent
effects on his own basic rights and interests. Thus it seems that the principle of utility is
incompatible with the conception of social cooperation among equals for mutual advan-
tage. It appears to be inconsistent with the idea of reciprocity implicit in the notion of a
well ordered society.”
18. Here is what he says in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, Belknap Press, 2001), 124: “[The difference principle] meets
the following reciprocity condition: those who are better off at any point are not better
off to the detriment of those who are worse off at that point. Since the parties represent
citizens as free and equal, and thus take equal division as the appropriate starting point,
we say this is an (not the only) appropriate reciprocity condition. We haven’t shown there
is no other such condition. But it is hard to imagine what it might be. [new paragraph]
To sum up: the difference principle expresses the idea that, starting from equal division,
the more advantaged are not better off at any point to the detriment of the less well off.
But since the difference principle applies to the basic structure, a deeper idea of reciprocity
implicit in it is that social institutions are not to take advantage of contingencies of native
endowment, or of initial social position, or of good or bad luck over the course of life,
except in ways that benefit everyone, including the least favored. This represents a fair
undertaking between the citizens seen as free and equal with respect to those inevitable
contingencies.” This is an elaboration of the idea from Rawls, A Theory of Justice, that
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of reciprocity at all but rather an incompletely stated version of the
general concept. I say incompletely stated, because his references to
reciprocity make no explicit mention of fittingness and proportionality
but only of the much vaguer notion of a fair return in kind, which is
a common oversimplification. This may be deliberate on his part, since
if he gave a fully articulated conception of fittingness and proportionality
he would then have to show how it is reflected in the difference prin-
ciple. Inequalities would have to be not only beneficial for the least
advantaged members of society but beneficial in a way that is demon-
strably fitting and proportional to what those members are asked to
contribute. This introduces significant complications that Rawls may well
have wished to postpone.
To be fair, however, this oversimplification in Rawls is not surprising.
In Western political philosophy, the concept of reciprocity is routinely
oversimplified and then either abandoned or abused. It is oversimplified
in at least four ways.
Direct, one-to-one exchanges.—One of these oversimplifications is the
frequent but usually unstated assumption that the standard case of rec-
iprocity is direct, one-to-one exchange. We often see this in discussions
of collective action problems, fair play, and prisoner’s dilemmas. The
assumption seems to be that rational actors will cooperate with others
only if those very others play fair and that playing fair means contrib-
uting to the project at hand. But in any large and complex social struc-
ture, a large percentage of our reciprocal behavior is indirect, or round-
about, or many-to-many. Some of us give money, say, to support Oxfam,
in the devout hope of never having to use its services, and what comes
around to us reciprocally, at 106 degrees of separation, is something so
remote from our contribution that we are unlikely to recognize it as
reciprocity for anything in particular. Moreover, many of the people and
institutions in the intervening links of the chain may themselves have
made no contribution to Oxfam or even be aware of its existence. Yet
we all understand the importance of these long chains of generalized
reciprocity and dutifully throw our various contributions to the wind in
the expectation that what goes around comes around. Direct, one-to-
one exchanges are no more central to the practice of reciprocity than
reciprocity is a matter of mutual benefit. What it adds is the interesting remark about the
“deeper idea of reciprocity” implicit in the difference principle. Nonetheless, this is cryptic
and quite possibly misleading. It is true that in reciprocal relationships we have a measure
of control over our lives that helps us transcend the “contingencies of native endowment,
or of initial social position, or of good or bad luck over the course of life.” That is a reason
for thinking people would choose, from behind the veil of ignorance, to organize their
lives in terms of reciprocity rather than status and luck. But it is startling to hear, without
analysis or argument, that a conception of reciprocity includes the notion that “social
institutions are not to take advantage of contingencies of native endowment,” etc. There
is clearly some deep connection here, but it is not an immediately clear connection.
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indirect and diffuse ones. Forgetting this—oversimplifying reciprocity
in this way—can be seriously misleading. It can mislead us into thinking
that people who don’t join us in contributing to our worthy causes are
ipso facto getting some benefit from us for free, when we actually might
be getting a roundabout reciprocal benefit from them in ways we haven’t
considered. This in turn can lead us to mischaracterize collective action
problems, even at the theoretical level, by isolating them from each
other and concluding, for example, that because a significant percent-
age of the population doesn’t vote, or doesn’t give blood, or doesn’t
vote for school bond issues, a significant percentage of the population
is riding free.
In-kind returns.—Another oversimplification is the frequent as-
sumption that reciprocity (direct or generalized) is equivalent to tit for
tat, in which you get back, roughly in kind, more or less what you put
in. But it is easy to find examples that embarrass that practice and then
to jump to the conclusion that reciprocity is at most some kind of
regulative rule of thumb, rather than a fundamental principle of justice.
Cephalus, recall, in book 1 of Plato’s Republic, offers the opinion that
justice is a matter of speaking the truth and paying your debts, and
Socrates produces a well-known counterexample—namely, that we don’t
want to return a weapon that a friend has left in our care if the friend
is deranged when he asks for it back.19 One consequence of this is clearly
a difficulty for reciprocity narrowly construed. How can we possibly think
that some principle like tit for tat undergirds justice or right conduct?
It must be the other way around.
Cephalus’s son Polemarchus doesn’t immediately see this difficulty
and proposes that justice is a matter of helping your friends and harming
your enemies—which is pretty close to saying outright that justice is a
matter of behaving reciprocally, returning good for good and harm for
harm. In this case Socrates tackles the idea of returning harm for harm.
He famously argues that it is unwise to inflict genuine harm on one’s
enemies, since that would only make them worse.20
But what Socrates in turn neglects is the way in which a failure to
reciprocate at all, in some more complicated sense than tit for tat, also
tends to make one’s enemies worse. They take advantage and never
learn. We can make them worse by harming them with punishment,
but we can also make them worse by turning the other cheek. Similarly,
we can ruin positive relationships by reciprocating too simply. If I give
you a pair of binoculars, that doesn’t mean it would be appropriate for
you to give me a pair in return—or in fact that it would be appropriate
19. Plato, The Republic, at 331c.
20. Ibid., at 335a–335e.
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for you to make a special, immediate effort to give me some tangible
thing directly linked to the binoculars.
Scope restrictions.—A third oversimplification is a restriction on the
scope of reciprocity. In particular, people are often uneasy with the idea
that they “owe” a reciprocal return of good for good to just anyone who
might benefit them. In the ancient and medieval worlds the scope was
limited mostly by status. Reciprocity among equals was routinely en-
dorsed, but reciprocity among unequals was judged to be unworkable,
unnecessary, or unseemly. (See Aristotle on friendship.21) At the mo-
ment, in the Western world at least, the scope is more frequently limited
to voluntary transactions. We are ready to accept the notion that if
people are engaged in an arrangement for mutual advantage, then they
have to do their fair share, and that involves reciprocating. But it is also
now common to think that we ought to be able to opt out of these
reciprocal obligations. Others may shower us with gifts, but if we don’t
ask for them and don’t accept them willingly, we should not be under
an obligation to make returns. Socrates, in Plato’s Crito, was concerned
about the contrapositive of that—the way in which accepting benefits
generates obligations. In these more individualist times, the leading
concern seems to be the other side of things. We want to keep our
escape routes open and our moral baggage packed.
What this neglects is the fact that the practice of reciprocity is a
feature of a very general human project—nothing less than living a
good life in concert with others. Reciprocal social relationships are an
important part of this, and we need a definition of reciprocity that can
handle the full range of our concerns. Restricting it to voluntary trans-
actions won’t work. Many of our most rewarding (as well as most bur-
dening) reciprocal relationships are not fully voluntary, either in origin
or in continuance. Think of parental and filial relationships and of those
growing out of one’s cultural and political heritage. To exclude the
norm of reciprocity from such relationships seems unwise, even if it
does close off some escape routes.
Equal absolute value.—A final oversimplification of reciprocity is the
assumption that the things exchanged must be of equal value in some
agent-independent sense. If I give you a beautiful work of art, for ex-
ample, then the assumption seems to be that you will have to respond
with something that is comparable in taste and market value. And if
that is the case, then it is easy to show again that reciprocity cannot be
a rock-bottom principle of justice because, left unchecked, it will gen-
erate seriously unfair burdens on the young, old, poor, powerless, un-
lucky, and disabled. If a child “owes” a thing of equal monetary value
and personal importance to his parents in return for his breathtakingly
21. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1162b (bk. 8, chap. 13).
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beautiful and liberating first bicycle, he will be burdened with this debt
for years, even though it might have cost his affluent parents little or
nothing, relative to their resources. Further, on a grander scale, such
obligations of reciprocity can create lasting hierarchical arrangements
in social and political life. The rich get richer in such exchanges, and
the powerful get more powerful, simply by engineering debts in others.
That result seems to drive yet another wedge between reciprocity and
justice and to suggest that we want the principles of justice to regulate
reciprocal exchanges, not the other way around.
That is also based on oversimplification—this time about the scale
of the returns that reciprocity requires. Once again, we need to address
the question in terms of the way reciprocal relationships contribute to
human flourishing generally. Then we will see that the appropriate rate
of exchange is not a simple one.
IV. RESTATEMENT OF A CONCEPTION OF RECIPROCITY
Here, in outline, is a conception of reciprocity—one way of developing
its vague, general concept that avoids the oversimplifications just dis-
cussed.22 In this conception of reciprocity, the standards for fittingness
and proportionality each have two parts—one part for the good we
receive and another for the bad—giving us four moving parts in all.
Both parts of the fittingness standard come from the range of things
that count as goods for the recipients, and in the case of reciprocating
for bad things, the standard is to return corrective good for bad received.
The two parts of the proportionality standard are that (a) for the good
we receive, we respond with an equal marginal sacrifice and (b) for the
bad, our corrective responses be directed to restoring and sustaining
productive reciprocal relationships. In this conception, moreover, the
norm of reciprocity covers all the good and bad we receive from others,
rather than just what is received in the course of voluntary transactions.
And it covers both direct, one-to-one relationships and indirect, gen-
eralized forms of reciprocity.
An elaborate justification can be given for endorsing this concep-
tion of reciprocity as a fundamental element of moral character, but
here I offer only the sort of brief, nonmoralized justification that would
presumably interest the tough crowd. Specifically, I appeal to the “gen-
eral justifying aim” implicit in social arrangements for mutual advantage
and argue that, in order to avoid defeating our pursuit of that aim, we
22. This section is a very compressed restatement of my earlier views, with some new
twists. See Lawrence C. Becker, Reciprocity (New York: Routledge, 1986; reprinted in pa-
perback by the University of Chicago Press, 1990). I do not think there is anything here
that is inconsistent with that book, but of course that might be wishful thinking.
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need to adopt either this conception of reciprocity or something very
like it.23
Fitting Returns for Good Received
Take fittingness first, in cases where we are responding to goods we
have received. Say that you are setting up a household, and I try to help,
uninvited. At considerable expense, I give you a spiffy toaster oven—
my very favorite kind of small appliance. How should you respond? If
you dislike toaster ovens, never use them, and already have three of
them from other busybodies, my fourth will not be welcome. It won’t
be a good for you, given your situation, and even my gesture in giving
it will be exasperating.
Suppose our conception of reciprocity in such cases simply amounts
to this: if no good is received, no return of good needs to be made. This
seems plausible, since strictly, in those cases, a return of good for good
received is not even logically possible. This conception of reciprocity
directs our attention to the value of the thing for the recipient, not for
the giver. It is pretty clear that my gift hasn’t given you a good to respond
to, apart from my good intentions. If you want to continue your rela-
tionship with me for the long haul, despite my blunder this time, my
good intentions will need to be reciprocated. But not the toaster oven.
It is important to notice here that if, as usual, recipients recognize
many things as goods, we have many options in making fitting returns
to them.24 We can return a friendly kiss with a friendly shove, a
neighbor’s kindness with a gift to a cause he admires, and a toaster
oven with a cautionary book about reciprocity. We can return money
from the March of Dimes with our time and energy in fund-raising
activity for them (a pretty direct, in-kind return), but also, perhaps, by
participating as subjects in the medical research they sponsor or by
becoming actively involved in another charitable organization. More-
over, in many cases we reciprocate most effectively by “passing it on”—
by treating the good we receive as part of the fabric of generalized
rather than direct reciprocity.
Careful attention to this standard of fittingness removes some of
the worries we may have about getting trapped in a bog of unwanted,
uninvited, and burdensome reciprocal exchanges—especially those in-
itiated by busybodies or reciprocity entrepreneurs. And it also leaves
23. I borrow the phrase “general justifying aim,” and the distinction between a general
justifying aim and a distributive principle, from H. L. A. Hart, “Prolegomenon to the
Principles of Punishment,” in his Punishment and Responsibility (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1968), 8–11.
24. I am grateful to Sophia Wong for suggesting that I emphasize this point in my
exposition.
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exactly the escape routes individualists want, even at the political level.
Living in a political system we did not choose and cannot leave, or a
system which showers us with things we despise, does not by itself create
obligations of reciprocity in us.
Fitting Returns for Bad Received
The next issue is reciprocity for wrongs, harms, and bad things generally.
A conception of reciprocity must define fittingness in this context as well.
Here the most plausible conception requires making a corrective response
designed to restore and sustain productive reciprocal relationships.
We usually think of this in terms of dealing with individual wrong-
doers, but it is important to remember that generalized reciprocity is
as essential to arrangements for mutual advantage as direct, tit-for-tat
exchanges may be. Passing on the harms we receive can sometimes
disrupt long chains of generalized reciprocity, just as direct retaliation
can sometimes make our enemies worse. A fitting response will have to
take both of these things into consideration.
Take the direct, individual case first—the case in which we have
received some intentional or negligent harm (perhaps through a crime
or a tort) from another. This is remote from the leading issues of justice
for the disabled, but it is instructive. With respect to crimes and torts,
an effective, corrective response may involve punishing the offender.
But that should not mislead us into thinking that retaliation, in the context
of managing arrangements for mutual advantage, could reasonably be any-
thing but an instrumental goal. As Plato points out, it is unreasonable
to make a genuinely harmful response—a response that makes the of-
fender genuinely worse than he already is, as opposed to temporarily
worse off. This is so, at least, as long as there is a reasonable possibility
of restoring mutually advantageous relationships. It is obvious that an
endless cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation is self-defeating. The
reasonable thing to do is to try to correct the situation, both by getting
restitution for our loss and by restoring productive reciprocal relation-
ships with the offender. This is reasonable, at any rate, for anyone dis-
posed to restore mutually advantageous arrangements, and I assume
that includes the tough crowd. Turning a losing situation into a gen-
uinely productive one will be better than merely minimizing one’s losses.
As a first approximation, the fitting return to the wrongdoer is
therefore not “bad for bad received” but rather “corrective good for
bad received,” where the correction turns the wrongdoer into a pro-
ductive partner in reciprocal arrangements for mutual advantage—or
failing that, simply prevents further harm. The usual complications arise
when the offender continues to pose a danger to us and we cannot
think of (or be sure of) a way of restoring a mutually advantageous
arrangement.
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As I mentioned earlier, however, we have more to think about than
correcting the wrongdoer. Specifically, we have to address the extent to
which our response to the harm will affect generalized reciprocity. Here
we reach issues central to justice for the disabled. Suppose the tough
crowd focuses on the burdens or harms imposed by the inability of
others to enter into direct, mutually advantageous arrangements with
them or to contribute to such arrangements through generalized rec-
iprocity. Here the principle of corrective good is even more straight-
forwardly justifiable. Corrective steps to turn our own disadvantage into
mutual advantage are clearly preferable to ignoring the situation, or to
allowing it to get worse, or to simply eliminating it. This has obvious
consequences for dealing with the disabled and for dealing with those
who care for them, because it commits us to programs of rehabilitation
for the disabled and to programs that provide respite for caregivers—
insofar as such programs are mutually advantageous.
Proportionality in Returning Good for Good Received
Here it helps to think first of simple commercial agreements and con-
tracts. We sometimes assume that such transactions will automatically
be balanced—proportional, fair—if they are fully voluntary. Contrac-
tualists, including Rawls, trade on this idea. But we cannot reasonably
assume that the notion of “balance” here involves equal, dollar-for-dollar
values for the parties. It is quite the opposite, even in ordinary com-
merce. If the things exchanged didn’t have different relative values,
there would be no economic motive for the transaction. I have cash;
you have a car to sell for cash. The economic motive for the deal is the
fact that your car is more valuable to me than my cash, while the opposite
is true for you. The notion of balance or proportionality in reciprocal
transactions generally can also have an agent-relative standard. In fact,
it is fairly easy to see that it ought to have such a standard.
We can see this if we again put reciprocity into its larger context—
specifically, into its role in the project of creating and sustaining mu-
tually advantageous social relationships generally. In that context (rather
than in the special case of exchanging commodities) it is clear that a
dollar-for-dollar exchange rate will often be self-defeating for the dis-
advantaged. The young, old, poor, powerless, unlucky, and disabled will
not be able to “afford” many such exchanges for long and will thus
often have to withdraw from them and from the relationships in which
they are embedded, thus defeating the mutual advantage project.
Either that or they will have to accept a redefinition of their recip-
rocal relationships in which their service, subservience, and deference
to the rich and fortunate count as goods. This is also self-defeating,
along two dimensions. One is that the disadvantaged are likely to exhaust
their ability to make such substitutions long before they exhaust their
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need for reciprocal relationships. The other is that such exhaustion is
likely to lead to class or caste resentments that produce social instability
and economic inefficiency—things that reciprocal relationships are sup-
posed to prevent.
Proportionality as equal sacrifice.—Suppose instead that our concep-
tion of reciprocity adopts an equal marginal sacrifice rule, under which
we make a return that is proportional to the sacrifice made by the givers
rather than proportional to the benefit we have received. This is hardly
a novel principle or even a controversial one in our personal, non-
economic dealings with each other. The parents who give a bicycle to
their five-year-old son can readily appreciate, as fully reciprocal affection,
the son’s hand-painted thank-you card. Similarly, the rich person who
gives to the poor can readily appreciate, as fully reciprocal, a response
that represents a marginal sacrifice roughly equal to her own and ap-
preciate the way in which expecting more than that would be expecting
some kind of unjust enrichment.
More important, the young, old, poor, powerless, unlucky, and dis-
abled will be able to sustain an equal marginal sacrifice relationship
over time without going deeper into debt. In terms of mutual advantage,
we can all understand how this is a good thing for everyone. (We have,
after all, abandoned debtor’s prisons and constructed bankruptcy law
on that understanding.) In fact, we understand this principle even in
the case of exchanging commodities. Henry Ford raised wages. Sam
Walton lowered prices. Both are forms of discounting that keep the
economy rolling. What the poor and the middle class get out of it is
the Ford Escort, not the BMW; the Wal-Mart experience, not the Neiman
Marcus one. But we get workable things, and the rich certainly do not
suffer for it. In fact, it is much to their advantage. Welfare liberalism
embraces a similar understanding of the value of Social Security, price
supports, disaster relief, food stamps, medical care, and so forth.
What the economic and political analysis of such discounting may
lack, however, is an explicit appreciation of the way in which satisfying
the equal marginal sacrifice rule is a form of full reciprocity—one that
exemplifies a form of fully balanced, equal exchange. It is not the only
form of equal exchange, and there are clearly cases in which we ought
to insist on a dollar-for-dollar rule. (See below.) But it is not wise to
regard those as the standard cases.
Objection about the most advantaged.—The equal marginal sacrifice
rule works well for the disadvantaged and presumably would interest
the tough crowd as a form of insurance against the possibility that they
themselves might lose their advantages. But might not this initial interest
evaporate with the thought that, under this rule, the well-off would soon
impoverish themselves in making equal marginal sacrifices to the poor
or disabled? After all, the declining marginal utility of goods would mean
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that in return for G provided by a disadvantaged person, the more
advantaged one would have to return G times x (where x is greater than
1) in order to equalize the “sacrifices.” Over time, it looks as though
that would result in a massive redistribution of wealth—and to avoid
that, wouldn’t the well-off soon withdraw into enclaves in which they
deal reciprocally only with themselves?25
Reply in terms of opportunity costs.—It is true that in fiscal policy equal
marginal sacrifice is associated with progressive tax rates and that such
rates (in theory) can have a leveling effect. But there is no such con-
sequence for reciprocity in general. Under the equal marginal sacrifice
rule there are almost always “advantage-preserving” options for the well-
off when they engage in reciprocal exchanges with the disadvantaged.
To see this, we need to remind ourselves that “sacrifice” is a met-
aphor here and is a seriously misleading one if it suggests that the point
is to equalize the subjective suffering involved on each side of a recip-
rocal exchange. Suffering is not the issue. Comprehensive economic
and noneconomic opportunity costs, in the context of mutually advan-
tageous exchanges, are the issue. One assumes that when such oppor-
tunity costs exceed the benefits of reciprocal exchanges, the tough
crowd is going to want to withdraw from them. But how often is that
going to be a problem in their dealings with the disadvantaged? Not
often.
This is so because, for the disadvantaged, the opportunity costs that
measure the sacrifice will typically be low and easily reciprocated by the
well-off. Think of a wealthy person receiving the benefit of a year’s labor
(let’s say, in caring for an elderly parent) from an otherwise unem-
ployable twenty-eight-year-old. What constitutes an equal marginal sac-
rifice in return? Paying a living wage for the year, plus benefits and a
leg up for the next job? A little more? A little less? To assess that, we
have to assess the extent of the caregiver’s comprehensive economic
and noneconomic opportunity costs versus the comprehensive benefits
she derives. And when we do that, an equal marginal return in this case
is not likely to be very steep for the well-off. For Bill Gates, the rate
would be steep only if he returned the opportunity costs of a year of,
say, Warren Buffet’s time, not if he returned the costs of mine.
Objection about exploitative conditions.—It might be objected that ex-
changes between the rich and the poor often take place under exploit-
ative background conditions, in which the opportunity costs for the poor
are kept artificially low. (Think about what happens when the wealthy
arrange to deal with a class of undocumented workers living under the
25. I am grateful to several people for pressing me to clarify this point, in particular
Jonathan Wolff, Agnieszka Jaworska, Ann Davis, Dan Brock, and Richard Arneson. I do
not mean to imply that they are convinced by my clarification.
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threat of deportation. Or when the male members of the tough crowd
arrange a set of gender-structured institutions that exploit women, per-
haps in various forms of caregiving for the young, old, and disabled.)
Reciprocity as I have described it seems designed to sustain, rather than
correct, such background conditions.
Reply in terms of the basic structure.—The reply is that the overall
project here is to convince the tough crowd to define the background
conditions, as well as the transactions within them, in terms of mutually
advantageous arrangements. Will the tough crowd balk at the equal
sacrifice rule with respect to designing the background conditions—the
basic structure? It is again hard to see why they would, as long as they
remain convinced to pursue mutually advantageous arrangements. An
equal benefit rule is not mutually advantageous, for the reasons given
earlier, and thus does not provide the well-off with insurance against
misadventure. An equal sacrifice rule, however, is mutually advanta-
geous, and consistent with the preservation of one’s advantages, whether
great or small. This is so because an equal sacrifice reflects both costs
and benefits. Those who benefit more than others have to contribute
more than others (in absolute terms) but, by the definition of the en-
terprise here, not in a way that fails to preserve a net advantage in doing
so. The well-off typically have many alternatives for making fitting re-
turns and thus can find ways to do it that are wealth- or advantage-
preserving for them under an equal sacrifice rule.
Could the well-off get a better deal for themselves? Certainly they
could by force or fraud. But for strategic reasons those things are off
the table, theoretically. Moreover, the disadvantaged would not agree
to a better deal for the well-off unless someone could think of one that
was better for them as well. And withdrawal from the basic structure
isn’t a winning option for anyone, well-off or not. Good help is hard to
find in a state of nature—or, for that matter, even among one’s friend-
liest peers, if the conditions of labor one is offering are exploitative.
Objection about in-kind returns.—But doesn’t the fittingness standard
sometimes require effort in return for effort, time in return for time,
love in return for love? And wouldn’t that effectively cost the rich much
more than the poor, in opportunity costs? Think again of the young
caregiver case and suppose the “employer” must respond with a year’s
service to the caregiver.
Reply in terms of fittingness.—Sometimes fittingness does require in-
kind returns. It is possible to construct cases in which this puts the well-
off at a temporary disadvantage under the equal sacrifice rule, but it is
hard to see how this yields a serious objection to it. Many such cases
can be dealt with by again referring to differentials in the opportunity
costs involved, which often favor the well-to-do. (If it is an equal sacrifice
of time that a philosophical genius needs to give me, and we measure
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that in opportunity costs, the exchange is going to be much briefer on
her side than on mine.) But perhaps there are more interesting cases.
For the young caregiver, we would need additional details to make
it plausible to assert that an in-kind return is required or even appro-
priate. (The same is true of every case in which we are restricted to in-
kind returns.) So suppose the caregiver is the employer’s estranged son
and that his offer of help is part of an effort to establish a compassionate
relationship with a cold, mostly absent, and exploitative father. In that
case, assuming that the new relationship is a genuine good for the father,
a cold cash arrangement is not going to bring it about for either father
or son, and it may be that time with the son is the only thing that will
do it.
Here it is a stretch to think that reciprocity is even a primary con-
cern in setting things right, but suppose it is. Then I suggest that if we
think of it in corrective terms (as something done to rectify years of
emotional neglect), and if we assume that an adequate corrective re-
sponse from the father would require a massive change in the father’s
life—in his priorities, commitments, and moral psychology—reciprocity
may well entail a more massive sacrifice for the father than for the son,
simply because an effective reciprocal response cannot be limited, in
practice, to an equal sacrifice. But by hypothesis, since nothing other
than this in-kind sacrifice is fitting, and nothing less than massive change
on the father’s part will do, we would have the same burdensome result
for the father under an equal benefit rule as we do under an equal
sacrifice rule.
In addition, we need to recall that mutual advantage in this context
remains the general justifying aim. If it costs the son a great deal to
make the overture, and if reciprocity for that in addition to the corrective
response for the past seems overwhelming, then reciprocity by any hard-
and-fast rule may be self-defeating. If so, persons who are fundamentally
interested in mutually advantageous relationships would want to adjust
the burdens accordingly, subordinating the rule to the general justifying
aim. Again, it is hard to fault the equal sacrifice rule. We reach a similar
result if the corrective issue is removed, and our only concern is with
the father’s response to the son’s overture.
In sum, equal marginal sacrifices will, as a general rule, sustain
generalized reciprocity, prevent the increased exploitation of some at
the expense of others, preserve the advantages people already have,
sustain most of our direct one-to-one reciprocal transactions, and pro-
mote the mutual advantage project. Moreover, as a general rule, equal
sacrifice is better in all these respects than an equal benefit rule. It is
a fully reciprocal response.
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Proportionality in Reciprocating for Bad Received
The question now is what counts as a proportionate amount of corrective
good in return for the bad we receive. This is complicated in practice,
but the idea is roughly this. The general justifying aim of the corrective
response is to restore mutually advantageous reciprocal relationships
between the wrongdoer and the wronged, and between those who are
unable to reciprocate and those who are able. Proportionality is a dis-
tributive principle that limits our pursuit of this aim by focusing cor-
rective responses on the size of the harm or disadvantage at issue and
on choosing the responses that promise to be restorative and productive.
In the case of intentional or negligent wrongdoers, we will address the
marginal injury done in order to make the injured party whole if pos-
sible, but also with the aim of producing maximally productive recip-
rocal relationships in the future. In the case of those who are unable
to reciprocate, or to reciprocate fully, the corrective response will be
focused entirely on the future, on ways of achieving the general justifying
aim.
Reciprocating for All the Good (and Bad) We Receive
The last issue is about scope. The question is whether our conception
of reciprocity will restrict the norm to voluntary or invited transactions,
thus making it a synonym for the notion of fair play, or whether we
want the norm to cover our responses to all the good and bad we receive.
The argument for the unrestricted conception of reciprocity can be
made in three steps.
First step.—Reciprocal relationships, especially those of a general-
ized sort, are an essential part of the social conditions necessary for
flourishing as human beings. They are necessary for a good life. This
is so because human beings have elaborate conceptions of themselves
as separate persons with individual interests; because our individual
interests often compete with those of others, yielding cooperation prob-
lems that only reciprocity reliably solves; because even the strongest
among us are dependent for long stretches of our lives and are vul-
nerable to misfortune, yielding recurrent needs for help that only rec-
iprocity—especially generalized reciprocity—reliably solves; and because
(although there are logical alternatives to it) a general pattern of fully
reciprocal relationships appears to be psychologically and sociologically
necessary for creating and sustaining the social conditions in which
human beings can flourish.26
26. See the social science literature referenced in the scholium to chap. 3 of Becker,
Reciprocity. In his typically fluid way, Rawls makes the point in A Theory of Justice as follows,
at 494–95: “The active sentiments of love and friendship, and even the sense of justice,
arise from the manifest intention of other persons to act for our good. Because we rec-
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Second step.—It is good to have essential social norms such as rec-
iprocity embedded in stable, pervasively potent character traits—that is,
embedded in pervasive dispositions to be sensitive to when and why
reciprocity is appropriate, to appreciate the range of methods for ap-
propriate reciprocation, and to have strong, almost reflexive, motives
to behave reciprocally.27 This is so for two reasons: first, because the
range, subtlety, and pervasiveness of occasions for reciprocity are so
great that a general readiness to reciprocate is needed—especially for
handling all the occasions for generalized reciprocity; second, because
a deeply embedded motive to reciprocate is effective in reeestablishing
cooperative and reciprocal relationships that have been disrupted.
Someone has to make the first move after a rupture. It helps if everyone
wants to get back to cooperating.28
Third step.—It is good to have an unlimited form of the disposition
to reciprocate, rather than one restricted to voluntary arrangements for
mutual advantage. This is so because restricted forms of reciprocity
cannot reliably sustain the social conditions for which generalized rec-
iprocity is necessary. It is generalized reciprocity that gives us a mech-
anism for dealing with the way in which injustice anywhere is (at least
sometimes) injustice everywhere and that gives us a way of avoiding or
ending tit-for-tat spirals of noncooperation, by making it possible to shift
our cooperative efforts to other projects rather than to end them. And
ognize that they wish us well, we care for their well-being in return. Thus we acquire
attachments to persons and institutions according to how we perceive our good to be
affected by them. The basic idea is one of reciprocity, a tendency to answer in kind. Now
this tendency is a deep psychological fact. Without it our nature would be very different
and fruitful social cooperation fragile if not impossible. For surely a rational person is not
indifferent to things that significantly affect his good; and supposing that he develops
some attitude toward them, he acquires either a new attachment or a new aversion. If we
answered love with hate, or came to dislike those who acted fairly toward us, or were
averse to activities that further our good, a community would soon dissolve. Beings with
a different psychology either have never existed or must soon have disappeared in the
course of evolution. A capacity for a sense of justice built up by responses in kind would
appear to be a condition of human sociability.”
27. This is compatible with the important argument about situational determinants
of behavior made by John Doris, Lack of Character: Personality and Moral Behavior (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002). While it may be true that the cardinal virtues of moral
character are normally much less fixed than we have traditionally assumed, it is still the
case that we have many sorts of stable, pervasive dispositions or character traits, ranging
from language acquisition and use to dispositions to adjust to what situations demand.
The disposition to reciprocate appears to be one of these stable and pervasive traits.
28. The so-called Stockholm syndrome, often presented as the tendency of long-held
hostages to become attached to their captors, is more complicated than that. Captors in
such situations also may become attached to their hostages, and some of this seems to
come about because minor reciprocal relationships spontaneously emerge from initiatives
on both sides. An imaginative and convincing account of this can be found in the novel
by Ann Patchett, Bel Canto (New York: HarperCollins, 2001).
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it is so because a restricted norm seems inconsistent with the moral
education needed to embed reciprocity in our character. Think of teach-
ing a child how to respond to unexpected, uninvited good from others,
such as a gift from a new neighbor. Not, presumably, with an insult or
injury, or even indifference, but rather with something neighborly. Not,
presumably, with something excessive, but rather with something pro-
portional. Making a fitting and proportional return is what defines
reciprocity.
V. WHERE THIS RESTATEMENT LEADS, FOR JUSTICE
AND THE DISABLED
Justice and Self-Interest
Think again about the central problem of the opening books of The
Republic. That problem is how to show that justice and individual well-
being coincide. At one point the conversation turns to the reasons peo-
ple might have, at bottom, for cooperating with each other and for
organizing themselves into societies in the first place. In the neighbor-
hood of what has become the individualist tradition in political theory,
Glaucon and Adeimantus argue that we must cooperate in order to
reduce interference from each other—in order to get the peace and
security we need to get on with our individual lives and projects. Soc-
rates, by contrast, moves over into the neighborhood of what has become
the collectivist tradition in political theory. We must cooperate, he says,
in order to accomplish things together that we cannot accomplish by
ourselves. He points to the benefits of a division of labor as an example.
Now in one sense individualism has won the day in Western secular
philosophy. Almost everyone of our acquaintance measures the success
of social organizations and political institutions in terms of their con-
sequences for the welfare of their members or in terms of their ability
to reflect the values and choices of their members (including religious
choices). Yet in another sense collectivism has won, since we seem thor-
oughly committed to a form of life that can be sustained only by elab-
orate systems of cooperation. This is reflected in persistent divisions in
political theory. In liberalism alone, for example, we have a libertarian
wing and a welfarist wing, and it is disturbing to see how difficult it has
been to bridge that divide. Recent philosophical work on justice for the
disabled illustrates this, with its debates about equality of resources ver-
sus opportunity versus welfare versus capabilities.29
29. See Sen, Inequality Reexamined, esp. chaps. 1–5; and Martha Nussbaum and Amartya
Sen, eds., The Quality of Life (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), esp. pt. 1; Ronald Dworkin,
Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2000), chaps. 1, 2, and 7; and Richard Arneson, “Luck and Equality II,” Supplement
to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75 (2001): 73–90.
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I suggest that work on the appropriate conception of reciprocity
holds the promise of bridging this gap. This is so, however, if and only
if we can eliminate the oversimplifications I mentioned earlier. In par-
ticular, we need to get beyond the idea that the paradigm case of rec-
iprocity is direct, tit-for-tat exchange and to focus every bit as much
attention on indirect, generalized reciprocity. And we need to under-
stand the way in which a plausible understanding of fittingness and
proportionality, in the context of generalized reciprocity, can make plain
how varied and surprising fully reciprocal relationships can be. My as-
sumption is that the libertarian wing will be impressed by the necessity
for and the payoffs of reciprocal relationships of a generalized sort (as
well as by the exits they leave open for people who tire of social obli-
gations) and that the welfare wing will be impressed by the inclusiveness
and supportiveness of such relationships (as well as by their robustness
in maintaining the social fabric). While the general “concept” of reci-
procity is not terribly impressive, some conceptions of reciprocity pro-
vide common ground for designing, motivating, and assessing social
and political institutions.
Theories of Justice Need Conceptions of Reciprocity
If justice is fundamentally about fairness and reciprocity is a form of
fairness, then perhaps we should insist that elaborate conceptions of
justice have comparably elaborate conceptions of reciprocity. A case in
point, as I have mentioned, is Rawls’s theory of justice, which makes
central references to reciprocity but lacks a developed conception of it.
Rawls’s theory is certainly not unique in this respect. This shortcoming
bedevils not only mutual advantage theories but also impartialist ones,
making it unnecessarily difficult to see the disabled as more than people
who lack the capacity for direct, tit-for-tat transactions at a dollar-for-
dollar rate of exchange, or as people who are other than a net drain
on aggregate welfare, or as people who lack the potential to thrive and
flourish as human beings. When we focus on a developed conception
of reciprocity we see things differently. At least we do if that conception
calls our attention to the importance of generalized reciprocity, an equal
marginal sacrifice standard of fully reciprocal exchanges, and a correc-
tive response for people’s inability to enter into productive, reciprocal
social relationships.
Health as a Basic Good: Corrective Health Care and Reciprocity
All of this leads me to be optimistic about the possibilities of mutual
advantage theory for dealing adequately with the issue of justice for the
disabled. This is especially so if we consider one further point: the
mutual advantage (in modern, industrial societies) of a strong social
commitment to corrective health care, broadly conceived, as a basic good.
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Reflecting on the needs of the disabled—indeed, the disadvantaged
generally—suggests to many people that the “capabilities approach”
taken most prominently by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum is on
the right track. And it certainly puts the theory of justice squarely in
line with the aims held by advocates for the disabled. The controlling
idea is that our fundamental social institutions should be designed not
only to permit but to promote, when necessary, the development of the
physical and psychological capabilities that make human flourishing
possible. To proceed with this, of course, we need to specify what those
capabilities are; we need to make a list. But this poses a serious difficulty
for solving the Tough-Crowd Problem if the list is tied to a particular
comprehensive view of human flourishing, such as an Aristotelian or a
Stoic one, since there is unlikely to be consensus in the tough crowd
in favor of any particular comprehensive view. The best we can do is
hope that most of the list will be found in what Rawls calls an overlapping
consensus. However, if the list is detached from a comprehensive view
it threatens to look ad hoc, and this ad hoc quality is likely to generate
persistent disagreement.
There is a less contentious route. The capabilities we care about
are closely connected to human physical and psychological health—
health for human individuals, that is, of varying stages of development
and of varying constitutions. Even for the tough crowd, health is now
ripe for inclusion in the list of basic goods. And it may be that a robust
social commitment to human health will adequately address questions
of justice for the disabled—as long as we are careful to include fun-
damental aspects of psychological health (i.e., those associated with
active rational agency) and to connect these matters properly to various
stages and types of human development. In doing this, we will have to
understand health as something more than the absence of disease or
life-threatening injury. We will have to understand it also as including
habilitation and rehabilitation. If we do that, then the needs of the
disabled—and those who are unhealthily burdened with their care—
will be included in an appropriate way. As a political project, I suspect
this is roughly equivalent to the capabilities approach—at least if our
current medical understanding of human health is roughly right—and
it strikes me as more promising politically, since we already have so
many medical and educational institutions devoted to human health.
Briefly, here are some reasons for thinking along these lines.
Problems of distributive justice arise only for goods that cooperative
efforts can in principle distribute. To restate a point made earlier: con-
temporary medicine, psychology, and education have raised the stakes for
theories of distributive justice in this respect. We can now do much more
to secure and sustain human health than previously, when there was not
much to be done in this area that would improve the result of simply
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seeing to it that people had adequate shelter; nutrition; rest; clothing;
personal hygiene; knowledgeable midwifery for childbirth and care of
newborns; knowledgeable nursing care for infections of various sorts;
somewhat more technical help with managing broken bones, open
wounds, and a few surgical operations that could be done without an-
esthesia; methods of diagnosing and managing shock; sterile technique;
or antibiotics. In those days, and probably well into the 1950s in the United
States, it was plausible to think that justice in health care could be treated
as a by-product of justice in the distribution of the goods necessary for
healthy people’s other fundamental projects—as a by-product of even
modest economic resources, for example, in a context of liberty, oppor-
tunity, and basic education for literacy and citizenship.
This no longer seems plausible. Dealing with the tough crowd by
way of a social contract tends to drive down the extent of redistributive
schemes proposed by welfarists. But the economic resources that it seems
reasonable (to the tough crowd) to guarantee to healthy people, as a
matter of justice, for the pursuit of their non-health-related projects are
pretty obviously not going to cover the cost of doing everything we can
do these days to restore them to health from the many diseases, injuries,
and disabilities we all face. Rational bargainers for mutual advantage
are going to want access to at least some of this care. We therefore
cannot plausibly treat health as a by-product of the distribution of other
basic goods. The argument for a social subsidy or an insurance scheme
is now a very strong one. (Something similar has happened to educa-
tion.) The arguments within the tough crowd are surely, now, mostly
about the details—about the best means for providing health care—
rather than substantive ones about the need for it.
Add to this, finally, the response required by reciprocity to the
burdens imposed (on the healthy) by others’ disabilities. It is plausible
to think that any defensible, developed conception of reciprocity will
direct us to make a corrective response to those burdens—one that is
aimed at restoring and sustaining a mutually advantageous level of re-
ciprocal transactions but also one that is limited by that goal, and not
by a commitment to make every possible medical procedure available
to all. That means, obviously, providing capability-building rehabilitation
wherever it can be effective in restoring or sustaining reciprocal social
life. It means providing the extra care and extra health care for the
disabled that are necessary for achieving the rehabilitative goals. It
means providing for the care of those for whom capability-building
rehabilitation is not possible, through a mutually advantageous form of
social insurance. And it means providing unpaid caregivers, especially
long-term family caregivers, with the respite and resources necessary to
restore and sustain their ability to have productive, mutually rewarding
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reciprocal relationships with others. It is hard to see how one could ask
more of a mutual advantage theory of justice on this issue.
VI. A RESIDUE OF INJUSTICE?
We need to consider, finally, a persistent source of dissatisfaction with
mutual advantage theories of justice altogether—not to mention impar-
tialist ones. That source of dissatisfaction is the way in which all such
theories appear to impose unfair arrangements on individuals (especially
the powerless) for reasons unrelated to those individuals’ particular in-
terests, needs, or claims. A theory does this when it locates the crucial
determinants of individual entitlements and just distributive arrange-
ments “outside” some individuals—for example, by defining a bargaining
procedure that effectively excludes some people, or an aggregation of
expected consequences that discounts their interests, or a conception of
excellence or flourishing that is inappropriate for them. A theory also
does this by limiting (as Hume does) the circumstances in which its basic
principles apply—leaving people to fend for themselves, as it were, in
circumstances of great political or economic instability.
People who have this dissatisfaction recognize that factors beyond
human control often impose burdens and benefits as if by chance, and
that bad luck is not by itself an injustice. Theories of justice, however,
are aimed in part at coping with the effects of this natural lottery, insofar
as that is possible. Thus, when theories shrink from dealing with bad
luck that does have a remedy—or worse, when theories effectively ratify
or amplify some of that bad luck—they appear to turn it into injustice
deliberately. If the standard theories cannot avoid doing that, then we
will not be able to deal adequately with the residue of injustice they
leave unless we find a way to modify them or replace them. In particular,
we would have to find a way to argue “outward” to a theory of justice
from within the interests, needs, claims, and capabilities of each indi-
vidual, and to do that in a way that remains fair to each at every step
in the process, no matter what the natural, political, social, or personal
circumstances may be.
That is a tall order. Too tall, probably. The only serious possibility
for carrying it out seems to be to supplement standard theories of justice
with a strong doctrine of inherent human dignity, moral worth, or in-
dividual rights.30
Consider rights, for example, that originate in the rights holders,
30. I assume that attempts to supplement standard theories with norms about caring
or benevolence will not be enough to satisfy advocates for the disabled, even if those
norms are norms of justice rather than of supererogation, since they make the welfare of
the disabled a derivative matter, elicited from the moral excellence of others rather than
required directly by the dignity or worth of the disabled themselves.
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as opposed to rights that derive from the duties or interests or benev-
olence of others, and rights that apply in every circumstance, not simply
in the circumstances of justice. These inherent rights might then trump
or constrain social contracts for mutual advantage, or impartial maxi-
mizing principles, on behalf of individuals who would otherwise be
treated unjustly. The problem is that such rights are themselves likely
to be contingent (e.g., on the resolution of prima facie conflicts) in
ways that reintroduce contracts for mutual advantage or impartial max-
imizing principles. As follows:
First step.—Any theory of inherent rights for individuals will either
allow the possibility of prima facie conflicts among rights in conditions
of scarcity or it will not. If not, then it will be restricted to such minimal
rights to freedom and well-being that it will not solve the problem at
issue. A person’s right to life that cannot in principle conflict with
another’s is a very weak one. Similarly for rights to liberty, well-being,
health, or property. Such minimal rights will not support strong redis-
tributive claims by the disabled on the time, attention, care, and re-
sources of others.
Second step.—If the theory of inherent rights does allow prima facie
conflicts of rights, it will either resolve them or not. If not, then it will
not solve the problem at issue but rather leave it in place for resolution
by another theory of justice, such as a mutual advantage one. In that
case, it is fair to think that the inherent rights are theoretically idle and
that mutual advantage (or utility) is the fundamental issue after all.
Third step.—Similarly, if the theory does resolve conflicts, it will
either do so on its own terms or not. If not, then again it will have to
appeal to principles that will leave the disabled vulnerable to changes
in circumstances, or changes in the social contract, or changes in the
interests, needs, or claims of others.
Fourth step.—Moreover, if the rights theory resolves conflicts on its
own terms it will have to construct interpersonal rankings of inherent
individual rights that will yield a unique solution to every priority prob-
lem between the disabled and others. Otherwise it will not solve the
problem at issue. So the question comes down to whether we can get
a theory of inherent individual rights of this very strong sort.
Fifth step.—That seems unlikely, for reasons expressed so convinc-
ingly by Mill in chapter 5 of Utilitarianism. Every attempt to set up a
right or a duty of justice that is independent of its consequences raises
the specter of indefensibility. If the right or duty is understood to be
absolute and without exceptions, it will either be aimless (ungrounded
in any larger, underlying enterprise) or self-defeating. Either option
leads to indefensibility. If the right or duty is understood to be condi-
tional or to have exceptions, however, then the definition of those con-
ditions or exceptions will in effect appeal to consequences. In that case,
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again, it is fair to think that the rights or duties involved are, at the
most fundamental level, theoretically idle and that mutual advantage
(or another consequentialist consideration) is the fundamental issue
after all.
I suggest that a similar argument can be constructed for any notion
of human dignity or moral worth that is meant to avoid the contingency
objection and to trump or constrain arrangements for mutual advantage
regardless of consequences. If this is correct, then on the question of
disabilities, conflict and contingency force us to return to standard the-
ories of justice. However, if the arguments here about reciprocity are
correct, mutual advantage theories, at least, have a good deal to say
about justice for the disabled.
